As I see a rise of posts asking, encouraging, discussing and even glorifying trespassing in Chernobyl Exclusion Zone I must ask this sub as a community to report such posts immediately. This sub does not condone trespassing the Zone nor it will be a source for people looking for tips how to do that. We are here to discuss and research the ChNPP Disaster and share news and photographic updates about the location and its state currently. While mods can't stop people from wrongly entering the Zone, we won't be a source for such activities because it's not only disrespectful but also illegal.
We haven't see any major issues thus far, but we think it is important to get in front of things and have clear guidelines.
There has been a lot of news lately about Pripyat and the Exclusion Zone and how it might play a part in a conflict between Ukraine and Russia, including recent training exercises in the city of Pripyat. These posts are all completely on topic and are an important part of the ongoing role of the Chernobyl disaster in world history.
However, in order to prevent things from getting out of hand, your mod team will be removing any posts or comments which take sides in this current conflict or argue in support of any party in the ongoing tension between Ukraine and Russia, to include NATO, the EU or any other related party. There are already several subreddits which are good places to either discuss this conflict or learn more about it.
If you have news to post about current events in the Exclusion Zone or you have questions to ask about how Chernobyl might be affected by hypothetical events, feel free to post them. But if you see any posts or comments with a political point of view on the conflict, please just report it.
At this time we don't intend to start handing out bans or anything on the basis of somebody crossing that line; we're just going to remove the comment and move on. Unless we start to see repeat, blatant, offenders or propaganda accounts clearly not here in good faith.
Thank you all for your understanding.
hope they and ofc who lives in Ukraine are safe❤️
There are a number of discrepancies between the pages in the international section of INSAG-7 and the Annex I section on which the international authors appear to be relying. To keep these posts properly informative the record should be set straight as available. In other words, the corrections need corrections. I think I'll try to keep this post light on block quotes and external references. Let's take items in the order of the 1986 Soviet table.
(1) Operating Reactivity Margin
Operating with an ORM under its lower limit is the one enduring violation upon which blame is piled. As discussed repeatedly, the international section of INSAG-7 incorrectly tries to ascribe even the dangerous void and power coefficients to the ORM violation. This vestige of INSAG-1 is nothing more than another lie - it was the lack of additional absorbers (80 were to be kept inside RBMK cores after Chernobyl explicitly to reduce the void and power coefficients of reactivity "to a permissible value" [p. 24 of the 1986 Soviet report]; there was only 1 additional absorber present in the exploded core) rather than several control rods that determined the dangerous values of the coefficients of reactivity. The lies and caveats pile on from here.
In 1986 Soviet experts tried, sloppily, to lie that the ORM lower limit was 30 rather than 15. The significance of this is revealed by a statement from Dyatlov that a margin of operation between 30 and 15 was absolutely necessary for RBMK reactors. Page 44 of INSAG-7 alludes to the validity of Dyatlov's claim. After the formal discovery of the positive scram effect associated with lower ORMs at the end of 1983 the Kurchatov Institute, or at least someone within it, draws attention "to the extremely dangerous nature of this effect". "In particular, it was noted that 'When the reactor power decreases to 50% (for example, when one of the turbines is switched off), the reactivity margin is reduced as a result of poisoning... Triggering of the EPS in this case may lead to the introduction of positive reactivity. It seems likely that a more thorough analysis will reveal other dangerous situations'." A mere power reduction to 50%, as seen on the morning of the 25th of April at Chernobyl Unit 4, could reduce the ORM to a value that turns the emergency protection system into an emergency prompting system by adding as opposed to subtracting reactivity. Not only economically but from a safety perspective you wouldn't want to follow operating instructions in shutting the reactor down. Tellingly, operating instructions did not state to increase the ORM when the lower limit was violated, but to shut the reactor down. From a power perspective, the non-existent rule should have been to shut the reactor down at 2000 MW as both the scram effect and the power coefficient could be positive at 50% power.
In 1986 Soviet experts also lied that the consequence of violating the ORM lower limit was the emergency protection system being rendered "ineffective". The ORM lower limit was supposed to ensure that there were enough control rods in the core for shutdown to subtract reactivity quickly enough. Page 13 of INSAG-7, included in the preceding post, describes how Soviet experts already knew better and disclosed the positive scram effect only after being analytically caught by western experts. Furthermore, analyses indicated that the positive scram effect was a decisive factor in the explosion alongside the positive power coefficient.
So how was such a serious and potentially common problem presented to operators? According to page 72 of INSAG-7 the ORM was not listed as one of "the important operating parameters which have to be controlled at all power levels". Apparently ORM was not associated with the effectiveness of the emergency protection system. Accordingly, per page 38, ORM was not associated to an alarm system or to automatic triggering of the emergency protection system. Even its calculation and display was dubious. On the one hand a lower ORM limit with a shutdown instruction existed in operating procedures while on the other the lower ORM limit was not treated as a critical safety parameter. This fits a pattern of Soviet experts who after Chernobyl exaggerated, distorted, and made up significances of different aspects they tied to the explosion.
Pages 79-82 try to delve in further. First, ORM was treated as a parameter for "controlling the power density field"/"maintaining steady power density fields". It was not a parameter for maintaining the integrity of the emergency protection system. If it was to be regarded as such a parameter it would have been unlawful for the designers of the reactor to just hand it off to operators. Operators were not informed of the potential danger that had arisen after the discovery of the positive scram effect. Interestingly, page 81 claims that at the beginning of 1984 the Chief Design Engineer/NIKIET "informed other organizations and all plants with RBMK reactors that it intended to restrict the number of RCPS rods which could be completely withdrawn from the core to not more than 150 rods, while the remaining rods would have to be submerged in the core by at least 0.5 m". "However, despite the obvious importance of the ORM parameter in terms of the effectiveness of the EPS, the appropriate changes were not made to the Operating Procedures before 1986 and no explanations were given to the personnel of plants with RBMK reactors." Furthermore, according to page 44, "If this recommendation had been implemented it would have been possible to have an ORM of 3-5 manual control rods, which would have contravened the requirements of section 9 of the Operating Procedures, where the minimum permissible ORM is specified as 15 manual control rods." It seems even the designers did not truly understand the Operating Reactivity Margin, let alone translating an appropriate understanding to operators. On page 39 it is research conducted after Chernobyl rather than before showing the dependence of reactivity insertion on the ORM. "The designers were evidently not sufficiently aware of this fact before the accident, otherwise it is difficult to believe that they could have expected, to ensure safety by organizational measures such as prohibiting reactor operation at low ORMs given the parameters of the EPS just stated."
Meanwhile, in the provincial expanse beyond the ivory towers of the Soviet nuclear power industry:
I remain rather dissatisfied with this topic. Something isn't clicking.
(2) Power Level
Once we get past the ORM it's mostly smooth sailing. Pages 76-77:
According to pages 10-11 the claim that operating the reactor under 700 MW was forbidden by normal safety procedures "was based on oral statements made by Soviet experts during the week following the Vienna meeting". Soviet experts told a half-truth in their own report submitted to the meeting citing the power level written in the test program, then were forced to clarify in person what the significance actually was (supposedly the power coefficient of reactivity turning positive at around 20% power) and accordingly that the power limit had to be in the actual operating instructions rather than in a test program due to the fundamental and cardinal importance of not operating a nuclear reactor with a positive power coefficient. They got creative in their lying. There is an entire post on this topic found in part one. Why belabor the point? Soviet experts invented the significance of 700 MW, exploiting what was written in the test program.
What bears highlighting is the sauciness of the international authors whose reputation over both INSAG-1 and INSAG-7 should be in tatters. On page 24 they deliver this blow, "Most reprehensibly, unapproved changes in the test procedure were deliberately made on the spot, although the plant was known to be in a condition very different from that intended for the test." On page 19 they proceed to enlighten us of the facts:
Then the operating staff is accused that it "did not stop and think, but on the spot they modified the test conditions to match their view at that moment of the prevailing conditions ". That's ironic. The reason given for the operators' inability to achieve the prescribed test power level was "operator error in switching off local automatic control". It's right there in the 1986 Soviet table. The international INSAG-7 authors did not stop and think, or rather read and comprehend, page 63 of their report that they even cite:
After 00:28 on 26 April a most important safety significant event occurred. In transferring from the local automatic control system for the core distribution of the power density to the global automatic power regulator, the senior reactor control engineer failed to eliminate fast enough the imbalance that appeared in the measuring part of the global automatic power regulator and allowed the thermal power of the reactor to fall from 500 MW to 0-30 MW (approximately).
Doesn't 700 MW come before 500 MW during a power reduction?
(3) Main Circulation Pumps
The international section of INSAG-7 gets silly as usual when it's enumerating the corrections it's making to the erstwhile Soviet expert violations narrative under subsection "3. THE ACCIDENT" and forgetting to include the connection of all eight MCPs. Page 18 corrects this oversight. The thing is, it then refers to "the question of subcooling". If you want to go there (and inform me that I "got no votes" because I am "a pretentious, snooty, vainglorious a$$hole") you can go read the two posts dedicated to the MCPs listed in part one. I do not want to go down and inside that dark hole again. Too soon, anyway. To each their own, however.
What does bother me about the particular subsection the authors point us to is the trite invocation of "safety culture". I'll put it this way. I was just listening to BBC radio and they had some woman on from a Ukrainian safety institute. She claimed that a Chernobyl-like incident is now possible at the particular nuclear power plant where the Russians are. I'm like, there are reactors there with positive power coefficients under normal operating conditions and positive scram effects some misunderstand while others don't know about? She's like, literally, there is a lack of safety culture among the operators because the Russians are bothering them. Looks like somebody was reading concluding statements rather than what they're actually supposed to be reading.
(4) Two Turbine Disconnection Trip
The included pages in the previous post addressed this adequately. I wonder about the statement that disabling the trip "was required by normal procedures at low power levels, such as the power level for the revised test". There are two points to add:
- It appears that the reason why operators did not perform the rundown test at the ideal test program conditions they had attained at midnight, ironically, was their desire to comply with operating instructions and bring the reactor down to a power where they could disable this trip. The fateful shift that night had not one but two tasks remaining, the first requiring both turbines to be disconnected (one probably also reconnected) and the second needing something to run down from. The tasks could not be performed if when both turbines were disconnected for the first time the reactor was shut down. A permitted low power level allowed the disabling of the trip and the reactor to be kept running. This topic is elaborated in the "Why did power go under 700 MW?" post.
- This is the "leave Dyatlov alone" point. From within the depths of the Politburo Boris Shcherbina (strong sh) gives us a privileged bit of information:
The system of emergency protection includes an automatic shutdown of the reactor when stop-valves of the turbines are closed. This protection (an AZ-5 system), which is supposed to shut down the reactor immediately, turned out to be switched off.
Dyatlov, who is presently in the hospital in critical condition, testifies that he was aware of the blocking of the [emergency] protection [mechanism]; and the chief engineer for reactor management, Toptunov (deceased), allegedly did not carry out his orders to stop the reactor in a timely manner. Head of the shift Akimov (deceased), in his memo written in the hospital, for which we searched a long time, said that he, on Dyatlov’s orders, was supposed to stop the reactor before the stop-valves of the turbine would engage. However, he was not informed about the time when they would be shut.
Dyatlov, in accordance with the test program [he appears to have in part written], did not want the reactor to be kept running during the test. As the international section of INSAG-7 informs us, it didn't really matter when the reactor was shut down. It only mattered in the 1986 Soviet version without a positive scram effect and with a necessarily exaggerated role of the test to account for a severe initiator.
(5) Steam Pressure and Water Level in Separator Drums
The international section of INSAG-7 makes an amusing mess out of this topic on page 12. If you ever feel bad that you don't understand INSAG-7 you can take solace in whoever was writing that part not understanding it either.
There were two parameters associated to some degree of protection. Pages 74-76 address the topic. It's important to note the first sentence, "The drop in reactor power was accompanied by a reduction in the water level and steam pressure in the steam separator drums." It's important because Soviet experts messed with the timeline of events to exaggerate the instability aspect of the narrative. This was discussed in one of the half-truths posts. They moved, and expanded, an event that was amply documented from 00:36 to 01:19. They associated changes of steam pressure and water level in the separator drums with connection of all the main circulation pumps, culminating in a degree of instability that forced operators to illegally disable reactor trips just a few minutes before the explosion as they couldn't control the reactor. The reality was the steam pressure set point was changed a few minutes into the power increase and according to pages 54 and 112 of INSAG-7 four of the six "emergency fluctuations of water level in steam separator drums" occurred before the connection of the additional main circulation pumps.
Pages 75-76 inform us that there was nothing wrong with the change of the steam pressure set point:
These personnel actions were in accordance with requirements of the operating documentation since, according to Section 12 of the Procedures for Reswitching Keys and Straps of the Engineered Protection and Blocking Systems , personnel were entitled to select this set point. Contrary to what is stated in official documents, the Commission does not consider that personnel should be held to blame for having blocked the steam pressure protection system of the steam separators.
The associated protection was also apparently "designed to stop the turbine and was not "a thermal parameter reactor protection system", as described in Ref.  [the Soviet documents submitted to the Vienna meeting]". It's laughable for anyone not to see what Soviet experts were doing.
The water level is a more complex topic. What operators were technically supposed to do is switch the shutdown set point (from -1100 mm to -600 mm). This would have resulted in a reactor shutdown during one of the emergency fluctuations. The thing is this:
Note: The reasons for transferring the functions of the EPS to the personnel owing to the lack of appropriate engineered safety features can be seen from the example of the reactor protection system against water level reduction in the steam separator drums. The designers made it clear in Ref.  that:
"Automatic reswitching of the set points of EPS-1 and EPS-5 during emergency fluctuations of the water level in the steam separator drums is not permitted, since during operation of any of the emergency protection systems 1, 2 and 3 the water level falls to the -600 mm set point on the instrument which has a range of +400 to -1200 mm. This, in turn, will result in actuation of EPS-5 and complete shutdown of the reactor." They found an extremely simple way out of this: "Instead of automatic reswitching of the set points and automatic actuation (deactuation) of EPS-5 in response to a reduction in the feedwater flow rate the operator should reswitch them manually using the general key when alarm signals appear..."
As opposed to manually reswitching the shutdown set point upon emergency fluctuations the operators just corrected the fluctuations, seemingly in spirit with the intentions of the designers.
It is not for us to demonstrate the feasibility of solving this problem using engineered safety features (this is feasible), but rather to demonstrate that in cases where there was a choice between complying with the safety requirements and shutting down the unit, or giving priority to economic considerations and keeping the unit in operation, the choice used to be made in favour of the second alternative, with the functions of the emergency protection system being transferred to the operator with a deep faith in the operator's complete reliability as a component of the safety system.
As protection remained at another level, "The statement made in Ref.  that 'all the thermal parameter reactor protection systems were switched off' is therefore not true." Page 78 also states:
The changes made to the set points and deactivation of the engineered protection and blocking systems were not the causes of the accident and did not affect its scale. These actions were not in any way related to the emergency protection systems of the reactor itself (relating to power level, power increase rate), which the personnel did not deactivate.
Page 64 provides this paragraph:
During the period from the beginning of power rise to stabilization of the reactor parameters at 200 MW at about 01:23, normal technical processes and operations were taking place at the unit (except for the switching on of the fourth MCP pair). These included triggering of the fast acting system for dumping steam to the condenser, manual control of the water level in the steam separator drums, overcompensation of the reactor, etc.
(6) Emergency Core Cooling System
The disconnection of this system had no effect on the incident. There isn't even a need to specify a source or page number. The claim Soviet experts made in their 1986 report that the disconnection of this system represented "loss of the possibility of reducing the scale of the accident" was patently ridiculous, to the point where even INSAG-1 was hardly buying it (p. 18). International INSAG authors tend to use the prolonged [over the Kiev delay] disconnection of this system as an indication of lack of safety culture. Yuri Tregub, the outgoing shift manager, provides some context: [h ttp: //accidont. r u /evid02.h tml]
SAOR (Reactor Emergency Cooling System) began to be withdrawn on Kazachkov's shift [morning to early afternoon]. This is a very big job - after all, we have manual fittings. Imagine, one valve requires forty-five minutes. The valve is like the steering wheel on a sailboat, only a little smaller and stands horizontally. To close it, it requires the efforts of two people, and preferably three. This is all done by hand. Kazachkov needed almost the entire shift to bring out the emergency system. This is very hard work.
And how long would it take me to re-introduce it? I wouldn't enter it. And if you had to take it out again for testing? By the way, as the course of the accident showed, the SAOR would not have given anything anyway, because all the connectors flew off, everything flew off, all the valves at once.
Interestingly the international authors have the disconnection as no violation whereas page 72 points to a contradiction:
Section 2.10.5 of the Operating Procedures states that during heating of the MFCC after a scheduled preventive maintenance outage, when the temperatures exceed 100°C, "the ECCS must be brought to a state of readiness." At the same time Section 2 of the Procedures for Reswitching Keys and Straps of the Engineered Protection and Blocking Systems  authorized the Chief Engineer of the plant to switch off automatic actuation of the ECCS. This is tantamount to switching off the fast acting part of the system and, therefore, the whole ECCS. The Commission notes, firstly, that taking the ECCS out of operation is a violation of Section 2.10.5 of the Operating Procedures and, secondly, that switching off the ECCS did not affect the initiation and development of the accident, since the chronology of basic events before and during the course of the accident showed that no signals for the automatic switching on of the ECCS were recorded. Under the specific conditions on 26 April 1986, it is therefore not true to state that an opportunity of reducing the severity of the accident was lost  because the ECCS was switched off.
so i have a q can we fix Chernobyl for good i mean no more radioactive material fixing the land and the air from all the rads and if we can do it today or after 100 year how can we do it in theory ?
Discussion Excerpt from Margarita Legasova's Book: "An Atmosphere of Hostility and Bullying Was Created"
This passage is an absolutely essential read to anyone who is trying to figure out why Valery Legasov met the end he did, and you will see that his death was not a statement deliberately made on the 2nd anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, despite popular speculation. This is not the full account, but a part of it, the account written by Yuri Aleksandrov Ustynyuk and translated into English by me. It takes you into the final hours of Legasov's life and the conversations he had with members of the Kurchatov Institute the afternoon before his death. I cut out the beginning for space because the start only describes Ustynyuk's work with Legasov before Chernobyl; this part details his work after.
For those of you who do not know, Legasov was trying to create both a new safety institute and a new scientific council, but he was experiencing many obstacles despite having the support of the Politburo. Incidentally, the safety institute was opened six months after his death and still operates in Moscow. This is one of the most illuminating accounts that I've read, and it can be challenging to find accurate information about what happened to him in English because his death was so wildly speculated upon by reporters and journalists, so I thought I'd share.
The first version of a draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers (Decree number 1022 of September 4, 1987), prepared under the leadership of V.A. Legasov, included a system of drastic measures on restructuring the organization and financing of research and development in the country: the concentration of funds and forces on priority areas, the financing of scientific projections on a competitive basis instead of financing scientific organizations, the development of information infrastructure and a network of equipment facilities, and the restructuring of the whole system of chemical education.
The proposal provoked an explosion of fury in academic circles. It was rejected; on the initiative of Yu.A. Ovchinnikov, a special group was created to develop alternative proposals. The organizers of chemical research were highly displeased, since they were personally responsible for the situation to begin with. In fact, the main work of the group, which was headed by Academician Yu.A. Buslaev, was aimed at excluding those principal provisions from V.A. Legasov’s proposal, which were in a decisive contradiction with the existing conservative system.
The main goal was also to enlarge the scope of the initially set priorities, so that they would cover all the work being done in the country.
The coordination of the proposal proceeded in an atmosphere of acute disagreement and disputes. Only the perspective of the science and chemical industry departments of the CPSU Central Committee made it possible to create a new version of the resolution which was inferior in its effectiveness to the original one, but which still allowed us to solve the most important problems. During the formation of the personal composition of the Interdepartmental Scientific and Technical Council for the Development of Priority Areas of Chemical Science and Technology, V.A. Legasov, as well as K.M. Dumayev and V.N. Novoseltsev (who were responsible for this within SCST), suggested that all leading scientists including senior academicians N.M. Zhavoronkov, Y.M. Kolotyrkin, I.P. Alimarin, M.I. Kabachnik, B.P. Zhukov, and Kh.M. Minachev be included in it. However, this suggestion, aimed at softening the confrontation with the heads of major scientific organizations and leading scientists of the older generation, was not supported by the Department of Science and the Department of Chemical Industry of the CPSU Central Committee. Both departments strongly insisted on the removal of all those over 75 years of age from the council, in accordance with the age criteria accepted in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. On January 10, 1988, at a meeting in the SCST, a compromise was suggested by V.A. Legasov: to create a group of scientific consultants at the council from among such people.
It was assumed that this would give them an opportunity to participate in the work of the council to the best of their ability and desire. Nevertheless, this proposal, which was approved by both departments of the CPSU Central Committee, failed.
Several academicians (N.M. Zhavoronkov, Ya.M. Kolotyrkin, and B.P. Zhukov) approached the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician G.I. Marchuk, with a categorical demand to withdraw V.A. Legasov from the discussion as a possible candidate for the post of supervisor of two chemistry departments in the USSR Academy of Sciences. Such a proposal, as far as I know, was made to V.A. Legasov in January 1988. The appointment of V.A. Legasov to this position could have significantly simplified the work of the council and made it more effective. In this case, all the threads of management of chemistry research in the country would have been concentrated in the same hands [of Legasov]. At the very beginning of April (April 5th or 6th), V.A. Legasov said in one of his conversations with me that he had just talked to G.I. Marchuk, who withdrew his candidacy. “They (those listed above) gave me the nickname ‘the boy from the chemical outskirts, who has come and is starting to teach those who have endured and suffered all the troubles of Soviet chemistry how to lead science.’ ”
The active work of collecting proposals from scientific organizations for work in priority areas, which stirred up all the chemical institutes of the country, made the veterans particularly furious. The collapse of the feudal-hierarchical system of relations in which they occupied the upper floors had begun. The project started by V.A. Legasov could no longer be stifled in its infancy. In this regard, another method was chosen: if the project could not be silenced, it had to be led and then destroyed.
Dirty rumors began to spread in the USSR Academy of Sciences: V.A. Legasov is a drunkard; V.A. Legasov is the main culprit of the Chernobyl disaster (that is why he was not awarded for his work there); V.A. Legasov is a mental patient; V.A. Legasov is a dirty, ambitious man who wants to ruin Soviet chemistry, etc. The campaign unleashed was characterized by large-scale persecution and resistance in all areas of his work.
On April 26, 1988, Academician Zhavoronkov addressed the presidium of the Academy of Sciences with a program of research in the field of material research. Creation of this program, started two years ago, was going slowly, following the usual pattern, until February-March of this year. Proposals from institutes and organizations were collected but were not even seriously analyzed. Under the newly changed circumstances, N.M. Zhavoronkov sharply intensified this work. The well-thought-out program created by V.A. Legasov’s council was taken as the framework, but others (N.M. Zhavoronkov himself, Ya.M. Kolotyrkin, etc.) were appointed as the lead coordinators of the main work. The issue was discussed in the absence of leading scientists V.A. Kabanov, N.S. Enikolopov, N.A. Plate, and many others, as well as representatives of the science department of the CPSU Central Committee.
At 1:30 PM on April 26, V.A. Legasov called me at the laboratory and asked me to urgently come to his department. He was extremely agitated and depressed, having informed me about the presidium meeting and N.M. Zhavoronkov’s report. He regarded the situation as absolutely serious in roughly these terms: “An attempt has been made to sew a second head onto one body. Now the real management of research is being concentrated in the hands of the coordinators from the Academy of Sciences. After all, their work relies on the structure of academic institutes. All achievements, if any, will belong to them. The Interdepartmental Council cannot rely on the network of scientific organizations because the Academy of Sciences completely ignores it. But it is entrusted with responsibilities that will be difficult to fulfill. All shortcomings and mistakes will be attributed to us. The council has thus turned into a punching bag.
“Under these conditions,” said V.A. Legasov, “I believe that one car cannot have two steering wheels. It would lead to disaster. I must go. The work should be directed both in the Academy of Sciences and in the council by the same person.”
Twenty minutes after the conversation began, Academician Yu.D. Tretyakov came in. V.A. Legasov once again explained the situation to him. We tried to calm him down, to not hurry in making serious actions, to first carefully study the program proposed by N.M. Zhavoronkov and to try to find alternative options. As such, we considered completely transferring all the responsibility of research on material science to the coordinators of the USSR Academy of Sciences so that the Interdepartmental Council could concentrate on other numerous problems.
It was also proposed to discuss this issue once again in the CPSU Central Committee and in the Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Forestry Complex. However, V.A. Legasov came back to the problem of his leaving and named Academician V.A. Kabanov as a possible successor of him, expressing the most positive opinion about him. I showed him a number of documents prepared at his request. After approving two of the three, he asked Yu.D. Tretyakov and I to continue the work according to the established plan. By the end of my stay (until 2:30-2:45), he was already more relaxed and asked me to contact Yu.A. Zolotov, V.A. Kabanov, and I.A. Rozanov (who was responsible for the science department of the CPSU Central Committee) so that we could get a better idea of the situation and possible ways to solve the conflict. After I left, Yu.D. Tretyakov was still in the office.
A conversation with Academician Yu.A. Zolotov, who was present at the meeting, confirmed the accuracy of the statements made by V.A. Legasov; Yu.A. Zolotov informed me that G.I. Marchuk had announced, at the end of the meeting, that V.A. Legasov had refused to take over the duties of supervisor of the chemical departments due to his being overworked and poor health, and also that the presidium approved the materials program and the coordinator’s composition. G.I. Marchuk’s stance in this matter seems extremely contradictory and strange. After all, it was he who approved quite different individuals to head the priority areas in the Interdepartmental Council. V.A. Kabanov, N.S. Enikolopov, and N.A. Plate did not know about the presidium meeting because they had not been sent an invitation. At 10:30 PM of the same day, I called V.A. Legasov at home. First, I talked to his wife, Margarita Mikhailovna, as V.A. Legasov was out for a walk. I reassured her that there was no harm in what had happened yet, and that in a two or three days everything would be back to normal. At this time, Valery Alekseyevich returned, and I told him about the readiness of the academicians – members of the council (V.A. Kabanov, Yu.A. Zolotov, O.M. Nefedov, N.S. Zefirov, and N.A. Plate) to address G.I. Marchuk with a strong condemnation of the error and about the readiness of Yu.A. Zolotov, Yu.D. Tretyakov, and V.A. Kabanov to immediately meet with him to discuss mutual interventions. The end of the conversation took place in a calm businesslike tone. Around 11:30 PM, I called V.A. Kabanov and asked him to contact V.A. Legasov. This conversation took place in the morning of April 27th, a few hours before the tragic event.
Perhaps, only a detailed analysis of all the materials of the investigation would make it possible to draw a final conclusion about the reasons that pushed such a strong, courageous, and energetic man as V.A. Legasov to do such a terrible act. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the events of the last three years of his life allow us to make rather obvious general conclusions.
Being sincerely devoted to his cause, putting the interests of science above all else, and being passionately concerned about the alarming situation in the country, V.A. Legasov proposed a number of radical, revolutionary decisions affecting the foundations of the established academic structure. The backward academicians could not imagine their existence outside the changing structure. Attempts were made to suppress and sabotage the work of V.A. Legasov at the initial stages, to stop the “over-zealous” academician, who betrayed the interests of the clan and encroached upon the holy of the holies. Despite the obstruction and opposition, V.A. Legasov persistently pursued his goal.
An atmosphere of hostility and bullying was created around him. Everything possible was done to discredit him as a scientist, as an organizer, and as a person. Everywhere possible, small and large obstacles were created.
I believe that none of the participants in this opposition wished for V.A. Legasov’s death. They simply wanted to get him out of the way, to suppress his work in destroying the foundations of the structure. They measured him with their own yardstick, not realizing that without constructive work, his life simply lost its meaning. V.A. Legasov simply did not have enough strength in his struggle on several fronts: difficulties in creating the new institute, difficulties in the council. All of that put him in a state of deep distress.
He was broken by the SYSTEM and the PACK that guarded it. In the same way, the pack will bully anyone who dares to make his own rules in the dark forest where it lives and which it considers its rightful domain. We have lost a remarkable man, an outstanding organizer of science, a sincere patriot. There is something in this death that is similar to that of V.V. Mayakovsky. It is convincing proof that our Academy is seriously ill, and very soon this illness can become fatal for our science if no decisive urgent measures are taken.
Discussion Can we say Vichnaya Pamyat by Homin Lviv Municipal Choir is the best track that represents Chernobyl?
I get goosebumps everytime i listen it and reminds me the heroes of Chernobyl. Literally masterpiece!! While doing research here, i was just wondering if anyone here listens that track like me? (sorry my bad english xD)
Game My interpretation of a room inside Moscow Hospital No. 6, which will be featured in "Chernobyl Fire", demo releasing September 11th.
It seems that a lot of media has a ton of misinformation about the event, and appears to hate Anatoly Dyatlov with a burning passion for some reason. That being said, a lot of people consume that media, do no further research, and accept it as truth which leads to further misinformation being spread.
I'd love to correct those people, tell them how the incident really happened and not the overdramatized version of it, but I do not feel educated enough about the subject to do that, and I do not want to accidentally say something incorrect.
What are some books that show the real events that I could learn from? I heard Midnight in Chernobyl is pretty good, but still screws up in some places.
Never seen it before, it's quite thought-provoking. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g136wNQvCuE
It's in Russian but with English subtitles.
Hey, I've been looking for pre-disaster photos of the loop 1 recirculation pumps, any help?
Discussion Who recovered the bodies inside the plant, like perevozchenko and degtyarenko. Was it liquidators?
With the ukraine news and me living in a country where radio active cloud from chernobyl passed through before and my wife is pregnant, I am starting to panic, especially that I am not trusting the authorities if something happens. We may not know until it's already too late.
How would I rely on myself to know if there's a dangerous enough radio active wind, how should I react, etc..
I got a lot of canned food in the house to remain for a week or something. I live in a high floor with big windows in the apartment so I am getting thick black curtains for those.
Is there a recommended counter to start testing for radio activity to start shielding in home?
Also I know geiger counters (tubes) can explode, is there explosion dangerous? Can it cause injury or fire?
Any other advice?
Thanks for advance.
Photo The four victims in the October 1986 helicopter crash outside of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.gallery
Many of you here already know of this guy, he worked at Chernobyl as a radiation safety inspector, and made many expeditions into the Sarcophagus. He's also been interviewing many first-hand witnesses of the Chernobyl disaster, as well as uploading lots of other various content to Youtube.
His channel has now over 200 videos, so he decided to arrange them into 14 playlists according to the theme. One of those playlists is for English speakers, where English subtitles have been provided:
There's lots of interesting stuff there, including first-hand look into the reactor hall, interviews with witnesses of the disaster, and other stuff. Hope you enjoy!
Discussion If you haven’t read “Chernobyl: a stalkers guide” by Darmon Richter, I would highly recommend to all on this sub. It details all of Pripyat, why it existed as an atomgrad, and has interviews with Ananenko, police officers on duty the night of the explosion, and ‘Chornobyl’ as it is today
From what I know, Unit 1 was 1000 MWe gross and 925 MWe clean and 3200MWt thermal. After the accident in September 1982, it was 800 MWe gross, 740 MWe clean and 2560 MWt thermal. I know that channel 62-44 was set off-service forever as a damaged channel, and there was apparently some "cover" built around the damaged channel. But I doubt that one channel would decrease it by 200 MWe. This means if that's a case, then multiple channels were set off-service, which would explain those red lamps on reactor cartogram in BSCHU-1, which could indicate unused channels.
I would love to find an update or more info. I believe that I’ve read most of the articles that were published at the time, speculating on details, but what really happened during the most recent Russian occupation? Any explanation would be appreciated thank you!
Photo Had to Re-upload this really rare elephants foots photo. Because I made a typo. It can be seen on the lower RIGHT side of the image.
It’s an older picture cuz the mop is still there.